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Abstract
Water is a crucial commodity, especially in the aftermath of disaster events. Healthcare
facilities, such as hospitals, require a water supply for both every day and emergency
processes. As required by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (JCAHO), healthcare facilities must stock a sufficient amount of water for
medical services following disaster events. The purpose of this research is to explore the
capabilities of healthcare facilities regarding the water supply for emergency purposes.
The study investigated the usage and preparedness trends of water supply in two hospitals
in Southeast Louisiana. The hospitals selected for research allowed for comparing and
contrasting of the capabilities of hospitals located in urban versus rural environments.
The study identifies key issues and trends in the emergency water supply systems at the
two hospitals. Common themes identified include the disparity of needs between the
hospitals in their respective environments, an adaptive capacity in addressing emergency
preparedness, and the need for spontaneous improvisation during crisis. The research
also identifies future research opportunities, such as improved recommendations of
salient rationing of resources and increasing use of cost-benefit reservoirs or water
acquisition means. The improvement of the emergency water supply capability can be
improved through collaboration with local emergency preparedness organizations,
construction of water towers on or near hospital grounds, and the use of synergetic water
reservoir capacity.
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Chapter One: Introduction
In the aftermath of a disaster, emergency supplies are necessary for many
purposes. Water is one of the most basic essential commodities and is often in emergent
needs in the timeframe immediately following a disaster. The supply of clean drinking
water is pertinent to maintain hydration and to provide for adequate sanitation processes
(Noji, 2005a). As water is usually provided by municipal suppliers, it may be absent as a
result of damage to critical transportation infrastructure or storage facilities.
Hospitals are an important component of the community. Hospitals provide lifesaving medical services and a considerable amount of employment opportunities
(Mandich & Dorfman, 2014; Zimmerman, Nicogossian, & Stewart, 2005). Healthcare
facilities cannot provide adequate services without a clean water supply. A hospital
closure necessitated by the disruption of water supply can place the community in the
unenviable position of being without a clean water supply, access to medical services, as
well as a large provider of employment.
Clean water is of vital importance for the health care systems in everyday
situations. Healthcare facilities such as hospitals must have appropriate resources to
maintain normal operations. Water is needed for a variety of purposes in healthcare
facilities, including food and drink, sanitation, sterilization, a variety of medical
procedures (e.g., dialysis, wound cleaning), electrical generation, ventilation, sewage
systems, and more. Hospital operations would be negatively affected if any one of these
processes was compromised, possibly leading to the rationing of services and the closure
of facilities.
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Clean water serves a critical role in the response and recovery following extreme
events. In the response phase, water is an indispensable resource for the treatment of
traumatic injuries or other complications arising from a disaster. The occurrence of
disruption of the water supply in such extreme events is rare but debilitating when it does
occur (Sternberg, 2003). Research literature suggests that failure of traditional water
supply for healthcare facilities is usually a result of an external disaster (Sternberg, 2003).
In the response and recovery phases, water is an integral resource for providing medical
care (Zimmerman et al., 2005). Thus, water is critically needed for long-term medical
care of injuries and illnesses in the aftermath of disaster.
The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO) oversees emergency water supplies for healthcare facilities. The JCAHO
recommends a two to three-day (48-72 hours) supply of resources to maintain critical
hospital functions in the event of an emergency (JCAHO, 2003). Welter, Bieber,
Bonnaffon, Deguida, and Socher (2010) reported that a high proportion of the water
supply is generally maintained in bottled form. The needs for water within hospitals are
more diverse than strictly drinking water. Hick, Barbera, & Kelen (2009) advised
increasing the amount of water in reserve to compensate for inadequate resources.
Bottled water presents an ephemeral supply and should not be used to satisfy all water
needs of a healthcare facility.
Several studies have reported poor preparedness and under-funding of disaster
preparedness in healthcare facilities (Cherry & Tranier, 2008; DeLorenzo, 2007; Kaji &
Lewis, 2006; Richter, 1997; Zimmerman et al., 2005). Deficiency of the emergency
water supply can inhibit the disaster preparedness of hospitals, especially during
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catastrophic situations. Welter et al. (2010) stated, “The 2.5-day supply number has been
based solely on bottled water stockpiles intended strictly for drinking.” (p. 70). As such,
hospitals often maintain emergency water supply in bottled form.
Maintaining water supplies through bottled water is not necessarily cost-effective.
Bottled water must be used or discarded by the expiration date. The storage of bottled
water is problematic due to the effects of stagnation. Preventing bacterial growth is a
primary concern for the water supply of healthcare facilities as they are providing
medical care for an especially vulnerable population (Casini et al., 2014). Water storage
is further complicated by the enormous amount of water necessary to maintain operations
at healthcare facilities when a disruption to the traditional water supply occurs.
Maintaining emergency water supplies with bottled water may not be practical for
continuity of operations for all critical services in healthcare facilities. Bottled water
supplies are not practical for use in fire prevention systems, the cooling of ventilation
systems, many medical procedures, and other pertinent hospital functions.
Without continuous water supply, healthcare facilities must begin to consider
rationing of resources and services. Previous instances of water supply failure
significantly affected the course of evacuation, once the water supply was compromised
and could not be immediately restored (Distefano, Graf, Lowry, & Sitler, 2006; Nates,
2004; Schultz, Koenig, & Lewis, 2003). The decision to evacuate is unfortunate, as times
of disaster often create increased demand for the medical services that hospitals provide.
Purpose Statement
What are the exact needs and capabilities of healthcare facilities regarding water
supply for use in emergency events? The purpose of this research is to explore the
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capabilities of healthcare facilities regarding the water supply for emergency
management. The goal of this thesis is to expand the knowledge base to provide an
understanding of future research needs for the emergency water supply of healthcare
facilities. This research project focuses on hospitals in Southeast Louisiana. This study
employed a mixed method design with a focus on the qualitative portion. This approach
allowed for the identification of common themes in the healthcare system. This research
is intended to contribute to future emergency water supply planning of healthcare
facilities and related industries.
Summary
Natural and man-made disasters often create chaotic moments in the timeframe
following devastating events. Many decisions occur in the heat of the moment, though
spontaneous planning can be limited by careful preparation. Decisions made prior to
disaster events can be very influential. Resources need to be optimally placed to address
the needs of the community for emergency management purposes. An essential
component of emergency management entails protecting vulnerable members of the
population.
Healthcare facilities are often responsible for caring for the most vulnerable of the
community. However, hospitals are unable to function following a disaster if they are not
prepared with adequate staff and resources. Adherence to emergency preparedness
guidelines is imperative and hospitals must recognize the full extent of needs throughout
the facility. Storage of large amounts of water needed to continue services throughout
healthcare facilities may contrast with the normal logistical procedures used to supply the
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facility on a day-to-day basis. A greater understanding of the needs and capabilities of
hospitals along with productive community planning will produce more salient outcomes.
This thesis is presented in five sections. Following this introduction section, a
detailed literature review considers the effects of disruption to water supplies for
healthcare facilities. A methodology section details the rationale for the research
instrument. The results section explains the findings. Finally, I discuss my findings, the
need for comprehensive emergency preparedness in healthcare facilities, and suggestions
for future practical applications and research.

Chapter Two: Literature Review
Water is a crucial commodity in the aftermath of disasters, especially in
healthcare facilities. Many hospital functions rely on a clean water supply. Pertinent
hospital functions include life-saving procedures as well as routine services.
Unfortunately, many hospitals are not prepared for catastrophic events, especially in
regards to the emergency water supply (Zimmerman et al., 2005). A lack of adequate
water reserves could easily lead to dire circumstances, eventually necessitating hospital
evacuation.
One of the most important functions of emergency management is providing
adequate supplies in time of disaster: food and water being crucial commodities. Storing
and maintaining food and water is a difficult task for emergency managers. The focus of
this review is to recognize previous instances of interruption of medical services related
to water supply disruption, identify the broad range of water needs for healthcare
facilities, and understand mitigation and preparedness measures that are considered
common practice among healthcare facilities in the United States.
This literature review is organized into four sections: (1) a brief review of
emergency management principles and risk management for healthcare facilities, (2)
examples and consequences of water supply interruption, (3) needs and uses of water in
healthcare facilities, followed by (4) a general review of hospital preparedness. A
combination of academic databases was utilized to complete the literature review
including Google Scholar, EBSCOhost, and ProQuest. The literature search included a
mix of key terms, including: “hospital,” “healthcare facilities,” “water supply,” “(critical)
infrastructure,” “logistics (management),” interruption, disruption, “evacuation,” risk
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management, emergency response, preparedness. Specific areas of hospital functions
were searched using terms such as “dialysis,” “ventilation,” “excreta,” and “sanitation.”
Existing water storage capabilities terms were also included: “bottled water,”
“expiration,” “PET properties,” “microorganisms,” and “reservoirs.” Research from all
dates was considered, with an emphasis on research published after 2001.
Hospital Disaster Preparedness
Emergency management of disaster events involves many different components.
The four major phases of emergency management are mitigation, preparedness, response,
and recovery (Phillips, Neal, & Webb, 2012). The US Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) describes mitigation as
measures meant to limit damage and harm through analysis, insurance, or risk reduction
actions (FEMA, 2017). Preparedness includes actions taken prior to, and in preparation
of, a disaster that cannot be performed through mitigation (National Governors
Association, 1979). Preparedness activities include logistical preparations, emergency
planning, exercises, and warning systems. The concept of response includes a broad
range of activities which occur after a disaster. The overall goal of recovery in
emergency management following a disaster is to restore affected communities to their
initial state or an improved community.
Far too often, first-hand accounts of disaster survivors describe horrific scenes.
Traumatic injuries and public health issues can quickly become concerning,
overwhelming, or detrimental. Healthcare facilities provide one the most crucial aspects
of infrastructure in the local community where the disaster occurs. As such, citizens
expect the medical community to understand its role and prepare appropriately to
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maintain medical services during times of crisis (Desforges & Waeckerle, 1991). There
is a substantial amount of literature available recognizing the need for emergency
preparedness in healthcare facilities (Cherry & Trainer, 2008; Kaji & Lewis, 2006;
Richter, 1997; & Zimmerman et al., 2005).
Past research focused on how hospitals organize logistically for catastrophic
situations (Cherry & Trainer, 2008; Hick et al., 2009; Schultz & Koenig, 2006;
VanVactor, 2011; VanVactor, 2012). Two of these studies considered implications on
the emergency water supply of healthcare facilities (Hick et al., 2009; Schultz & Koenig,
2006). Hick et al. (2009) and Schultz and Koenig (2006) focused on hospital needs
during crisis events, while peripherally addressing water supply issues. Both studies
focused on the overflow of patients in hospital emergency rooms, an issue that called for
robust logistical supplies, including water resources.
There are many emergency preparedness processes to consider, especially in
organizations as complex as healthcare institutions. Emergency preparedness relevant to
healthcare facilities occurs internally and externally in the community. The ability to
manage a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) is the basis for providing more extensive
preparedness for disaster situations (Adini et al., 2006). Current standards recommend
that healthcare facilities prepare for the possibility of 48-72 hours of stand-alone
capabilities (JCAHO, 2003). Local communities are also responsible for emergency
preparedness and often collaborate with public health resources.
Community emergency preparedness coalitions or groups often utilize the input of
a wide variety of interested stakeholders from public health, public safety, educational
institutions, critical infrastructure, healthcare providers, and public administrators.
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(JCAHO, 2005). Local communities commonly address health and medical response in
their emergency operations plans (Braun et al., 2006). However, ineffective
collaboration and coordination between communities and healthcare facilities limit
effective preparation. Barriers to comprehensive preparedness include a lack of clarity
recognizing responsible parties, obfuscation of critical preparedness elements, limited
coordination with applicable state and federal resources, and the ability to secure and
sustain funding (JCAHO, 2005). Rural communities are especially inhibited compared to
larger, urban providers. Rural hospitals are generally constrained by fewer resources,
such as staff and infrastructure, lack of excess capacity, less economic resources, reliance
on volunteers, geography, and transportation difficulties, among other issues (JCAHO,
2005). The wide variety of stakeholders, underdeveloped funding mechanisms, and the
infrequency of disaster events constrain comprehensive preparedness processes.
Risk management. Traditional risk management in healthcare facilities assumes
an entirely different structure of risk perception than is commonly situated in the context
of emergency preparedness. According to Zimmerman et al. (2005), “Risk management
in the health services is historically related to reducing the impact of medical mistakes
and managing the liability of accidents and malpractice” (p. 23). Historical views of risk
management for healthcare facilities does not address comprehensive emergency
management for disastrous scenarios which can occur due to unexpected hazardous
events. Risk management of medical liability entails a narrow, internal viewpoint.
Hospitals are subject to vulnerability from internal or external events. Internal
disasters include events such as fire, computer malfunction, or water supply failure.
External vulnerability results from natural or man-made disasters. Sternberg (2003)
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defined an internal disaster as any sudden, hazardous event that disrupts normal
operation. Sternberg (2003) also recognized a variety of uncertainties can lead to internal
disasters. These uncertainties include hazard, incidental, sequential, informational,
consequential, cascade, organizational, and background issues. Hazardous uncertainty
arises from specific threats, such as a natural disaster. Incidental uncertainty refers to an
accident that creates a larger threat. Sequential uncertainty occurs due to a series of
events. Limited, excessive, or questionable information leads to confusion and
informational uncertainty. Consequential uncertainty is that which is unexpected.
Cascading uncertainty explains how failure in one system may affect other systems.
Organizational uncertainty can be related to structure or personnel. Finally, background
uncertainty refers to unknown external conditions or resources. With this large variety of
uncertainties, it is impossible to respond to a specific event with limited resources. Thus,
the primary goal of emergency preparedness is to plan for all-hazards by recognizing
consistent patterns in response.
The all-hazards approach to emergency management is relevant to emergency
preparedness in healthcare facilities. The all-hazards approach recognizes similarities
among different types of disaster events (Phillips et al., 2012). Several studies have
documented an increase in patients following a disaster, combined with staffing shortages
(Bolut, Fedekar, Akkose, Ozguc, & Tokyay, 2005; Hick et al., 2009; Schultz & Koenig,
2006). Surge capacity is a term used to describe additional patient loads, which often
occurs in the aftermath of catastrophic events. Surge capacity is defined as additional
resource demand in relation to routine needs (Kelen & McCarthy, 2006). Kelen and
McCarthy (2006) further explained surge capacity as the maximum amount of resources
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that can be delivered and utilized. Kelen and McCarthy’s (2006) description of surge
capacity relates to a broad array of institutions that may be faced with increased demand
in relation to available resources. Schultz and Koenig (2006) provided a description of
surge capacity specific to healthcare organizations recognizing the requirements needed
for treatment of sudden, unforeseen increases in patient volumes. In general, the
resources needed to treat specific volumes of patients are constant. In a surge situation,
the necessary resources are increased due to unexpected and excessive demand.
Various benchmarks describe surge capacity preparation. In Israel, hospital’s
emergency operation plans are expected to address twenty percent higher volumes over
average patient census during crisis situations (Schultz & Koenig, 2006). In the U.S., the
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) recommended the ability to treat
between fifty and five hundred more patients for every 1,000,000 in population,
depending on various scenarios, such as natural hazards or pandemics (HRSA, 2005).
Increased patient loads have been noted between twenty-four and forty-eight hours
following disaster events (Bolut et al., 2005). Bayram et al. (2013) utilized focus groups
of hospital staff and administrators to identify resources pertinent to medical care during
surge capacity. The research found increased need for a variety of necessary medical
supplies during surge events. Prominent resources needed included copious amounts of
intravenous fluids, along with lesser need for dialysate and sterile water (Bayram et al.,
2013). The focus groups primarily focused on medical supplies, and results did not
reflect the importance of critical infrastructure or essential commodities such as food and
water.
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Schultz and Koenig (2006) advised that emergency preparedness in healthcare
facilities is best performed with suitable staff, supplies, structure, and systems
management. This combination of components was termed the 4S standard by the
authors. Staff must be both adequate in number and prepared to successfully complete
goals. Supplies need to be sufficient to maintain operations throughout the emergency
timeframe. The structure of the building must be stable, remaining intact throughout a
disaster. Finally, the management structure must be prepared and organized sufficiently
to provide effective leadership throughout a crisis situation. Schultz and Koenig (2006)
reported that hospitals are constrained by governmental regulations, hospital standards,
and internal policies. The hospital is vulnerable if any of the four components are
compromised.
Supplies are a crucial component of Schultz and Koenig’s (2006) 4S theory, as
hospital preparations cannot progress without adequate resources. Several theories have
addressed pre-positioning of relief supplies for use in case of disaster (Rawls &
Turnquist, 2010; Van Wyck, Bean, & Yadavalli, 2011; Van Wyck & Yadavalli, 2011).
Recent work based on computer modeling and focus on distribution. Rawls and
Turnquist (2010) presented a mixed-integer computer algorithm for ideal placement of
disaster relief supplies. Van Wyck and Yadavalli (2011) produced a computer algorithm
model to address the preparation of relief supplies. A subsequent study by Van Wyck et
al. (2011) refined the algorithm by adding a cost analysis function. However, these
studies (Rawls & Turnquist, 2010; Van Wyck et al., 2011; Van Wyck & Yadavalli, 2011)
did not address healthcare facility needs or specifically consider positioning supplies at or
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near hospitals, refugee camps, or where the population is likely to congregate in the
aftermath of a disaster.
Other studies have focused on the delivery of relief supplies, such as how to best
deliver water in the aftermath of disasters based on computer algorithms, with up-to-date
data regarding transportation delays or route closures (Nolz, Doerner, & Hartl, 2010;
Nolz, Semet, & Doerner, 2011). These studies emphasized transportation alternatives in
the routing of relief supplies in the aftermath of disasters.
Little information is available regarding logistical management of supplies needed
in crisis situations in healthcare facilities. There are four categories of inventory in
healthcare facilities: cyclic, seasonal, safety and contingency (VanVactor, 2011). Cyclic
inventory refers to items in stock that are constantly used and rotated. Seasonal inventory
is added due to expected increases in demand during certain timeframes. An example of
seasonal inventory includes additional heat packs that may be needed in winter months.
Safety inventory includes commonly used items overstocked to surplus levels, but still
needed on a routine basis. Contingency inventory includes rarely used items necessary
for certain rare situations (e.g., anti-venom). An emerging trend in hospital supply has
been through Just-In-Time (JIT) logistics (Cherry & Trainer, 2008; VanVactor, 2012).
JIT creates efficiency through the delivery of supplies on an as-needed basis. The JIT
theory contrasts with the tenets of emergency preparedness where relief supplies are
stored until needed.
Auditing tools are used to determine water supply needs of healthcare facilities.
Routine water supply needs can be calculated by average daily sewerage rates. Several
auditing tools are available to help healthcare organizations understand risks, needs, and
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capabilities. Commonly used auditing software programs are available through the
American Society of Healthcare Engineers (ASHE), Kaiser Permanente, and HCPro, Inc.
(Campbell, Trockman, & Walker, 2011). Auditing tools can be very useful, especially if
facilities make appropriate adjustments to problem areas. However, “Too many of our
nation’s hospitals have become complacent over disaster preparedness. They develop a
document to meet a licensure requirement of a Joint Commission of Healthcare
Organizations standard” (Richter, 1997, p. 1). Richter stated these sentiments nearly
twenty years ago and there is not much reason to believe that the culture of emergency
preparedness in healthcare facilities has completely changed since. A more recent study
reported the 48 to 72-hour threshold is being prepared for primarily with bottled water
intended solely for drinking purposes (Welter et al., 2010). Thus, for auditing purposes,
the drinking water needs throughout healthcare facilities are the primary consideration.
However, the true water needs of healthcare facilities are much more diverse.
The process to supply a healthcare facility on a daily basis is complex. Supply of
a hospital may be difficult, if not impossible, in the aftermath of disasters. Conceivably,
healthcare facilities could request the assistance of federal agencies responding to disaster
events following a presidential disaster declaration. Federal relief would be onerous and
require the assistance of several agencies (Byrne, 2008). Several regulatory processes
must be followed for federal agencies to provide disaster relief supplies. A more robust
supply stockpile, within the facility, would allow for conventional operations to resume
for a longer duration (Hick et al., 2009). Effective preparation through adequate supply
and redundancy can be vital as hospitals are expected to continue operations without
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outside support (Arbodela, Abraham, Richard, & Lubitz, 2006). Water is one of the most
important relief supplies as healthcare facilities cannot operate without a water supply.
Lack of preparedness. In general, hospitals perform emergency preparedness
functions through exercises and drills. Exercises and drills allow for staff development of
organizational structure and additional medical training. Emergency preparedness,
through drills and exercises, improves the capabilities of staff members and the
management system as noted by Schultz and Koenig (2006). However, preparedness
drills are expensive, especially when performed with large staffs. Hospitals may find it
difficult to provide resources to plan for emergency situations which are uncertain to
occur in the future.
Limited numbers of disaster exercises and drills lead to a general lack of
preparedness in healthcare facilities. An early study by Waeckerle, in 1991, detailed how
disasters are sudden and unexpected, thus necessitating more planning for hospitals and
medical personnel. Kaji and Lewis (2006) found poor preparedness levels among
hospitals in Los Angeles, California. Wise (2006) also noted poor emergency planning
for healthcare facilities. The author found better outcomes occurred with enhanced
planning processes (Wise, 2006). Preparedness exercises and planning are important, but
hospitals also require adequate infrastructure to function properly.
The structure of the hospital building is just as important as the administration,
equipment, and infrastructure. Schultz and Koenig (2006) noted the importance of the
structure to withstand the impact of disaster. Vulnerability assessments can help to
pinpoint weak spots and guide preparedness planning. Two studies have called for
hospitals to prepare further by providing more in-depth vulnerability assessments
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(Arbodela et al., 2006; Kuwata & Takada, 2007). Vulnerability assessments can provide
increased understanding of protection measures available for specific threats endemic to
certain geographic locales, such as earthquake or flood zones.
Instances of Emergency Water Supply Disruption
There have been multiple instances in which hospitals have had to cope with
interruption to the emergency water supply. There were 286 hospital evacuations
between 1950 and 2005 (Distefano et al., 2006). Twenty-two of these instances were
full-hospital evacuations. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact number of evacuations
related to water supply disruption. Past research shows several examples of water supply
disruption affecting healthcare facilities. Past examples include the 1993 flood, the
Northridge Earthquake, Tropical Storm Allison, Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Sandy, and
others.
1993 flood. The 1993 flood affected the Iowa Methodist Medical Center in July
1993 when the swollen Des Moines and Raccoon Rivers caused extraordinary flooding in
Des Moines, Iowa. The flooding contaminated the municipal water supply, leading to
water supply interruption for three weeks (Sternberg, 2003). Hospital employees
immediately recognized the danger to the water supply and were able to shut off the flow
of water from the municipal supply. Closing off the external water supply ensured no
decontamination occurred within the hospital system. A review by Ramsey (1994)
portrays a harrowing and extraordinary tale where the hospital was able to maintain
operation throughout the ordeal. Water was supplied to the hospital via tanker trucks and
5-gallon containers. The effort to resupply the facility was adequate to provide for
critical services. Rationing of water resources was necessary, such as limiting shower
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usage and laundry services. A limited number of necessary surgeries were performed and
autoclave sanitizing was performed with the bottled water. Bottled water was also used
for excreta removal via toilet flush. The hospital remained on partial power due to standby generators requiring water for cooling. The resupply of water via alternate sources did
not facilitate usage for the water-cooled generator system. Eventually, the National
Guard provided a 50,000-gallon water bladder with water purification occurring within
the facility.
Northridge Earthquake. The Northridge Earthquake occurred in the early
morning hours of January 17, 1994 in Northridge, California. The earthquake registered
6.7 on the Richter scale and caused widespread damage. The earthquake forced the
evacuation of eight hospitals (DiStefano et al., 2006). Two of the hospitals utilized
partial evacuations and six performed complete evacuations (Schultz et al., 2003). Five
of these facilities reported non-structural damage to water supply infrastructure as a
critical factor in the decision to evacuate. The affected hospitals recognized that their
water supply was compromised. The facilities would also face difficulty enlisting
assistance from outside agencies due to the scope of damage to the overall region. Over
1,000 patients were transferred to alternative facilities throughout this event. The
vulnerability of California hospitals persisted as a follow-up report showed 46% of
hospitals in the region were in danger of structural failure in the event of a similar size
earthquake. Additionally, 91% were in danger of non-structural damage of the type that
caused the majority of evacuations (Schultz et al., 2003).
Tropical Storm Allison. Tropical Storm Allison affected Houston, Texas in June
2001. Tropical Storm Allison was characterized as an extraordinary rain event leading to
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extensive flooding in the metropolitan Houston area. This storm system severely affected
the Texas Medical Center (TMC), which included thirteen hospitals and two medical
schools with over 6,000 patients. Tropical Storm Allison caused $2 billion in damage to
TMC (Distefano et al., 2006). Nates (2004) reported how Mount Herman Memorial
(MHM) became isolated due to loss of electricity, communication, and water supply.
MHM evacuated their facility and remained closed for thirty-eight days. The effects of
Tropical Storm Allison highlighted the importance of protecting electricity, water
supplies, and other critical infrastructure.
Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina was a Category 4 hurricane that
significantly affected Mississippi and Southeast Louisiana in August and September of
2005. Hurricane Katrina led to the inundation of the majority of the city of New Orleans
throughout the month of September. The flooding impacted multiple hospitals in the city
of New Orleans, leading to an inability to provide medical services at these facilities
(Klein & Nagel, 2007). Area hospitals stocked up on additional emergency water
supplies after advanced warnings were issued and prior to hurricane landfall. Butcher
(2006) presented an account of one of the larger hospitals in the region, Charity Hospital
(CH), located in downtown New Orleans. CH had 14,000 gallons of water on hand at the
time of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. Nonetheless, the duration of events led to a dire
situation at CH, such as shortages of water for dialysis, personal hygiene, fire-fighting
capabilities, and waste removal (Brevard et al., 2008). A review of the circumstances
that affected the hospitals during Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath calls for further
risk-based planning and enhancing improvisational abilities (Edwards, 2009). Hurricane
Katrina was a defining moment for hospital preparedness and healthcare facilities.
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Hospitals across the country have since recognized the implications of inadequate
preparedness (Powell, Hanfling, & Gustin, 2012). The size and scope of the disaster, the
number of hospitals impacted, and the extent of the population affected by Hurricane
Katrina provides an ideal scenario for future planning.
Hurricane Sandy. Hurricane Sandy was a Category 3 hurricane that caused
widespread destruction in New Jersey and New York in November 2012. The storm left
widespread flooding in the surrounding regions, affecting hospitals in New York City.
Two New York City hospitals required evacuation after the fuel pumps used for electrical
generation were flooded (Redlener & Reilly, 2012). The flooded fuel pumps were
located in the basement of these facilities. A ladder patrol was formed to bring fuel
directly to the generators. This effort was unsustainable, leading to the call for the
evacuation. Redlener and Reilly (2012) reported that healthcare facilities must do a
better job of learning from previous disaster experiences and putting knowledge learned
into future planning. Although the generators were raised in these facilities, not all the
infrastructure required for their use was adequately protected.
Other scenarios. Hurricane, earthquakes, and other disasters are exceptional
events. History tells us that these types of events happen from time to time. However, it
does not take a disaster on a grand scale to cause operations at hospitals to be severely
impacted. The 1993 flood, the Northridge Earthquake, Tropical Storm Allison,
Hurricane Katrina, and Hurricane Sandy are not the only examples of water supply
disruption affecting hospitals as there are several other similar instances to note.
The water supply of healthcare facilities can become comprised through a variety
of means. Causes of disruption may seem minor at the onset and then grow into a larger
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problem. For example, an event occurred in Seattle, WA in 1997 due to a sewer
blockage (Sternberg, 2003). The blockage of the sewer line eventually backed-up excreta
into several departments of the hospital. The excreta back-up interrupted laboratory and
radiological services, and caused partial evacuation of the facility (Sternberg, 2003).
While this is an isolated incident, hospitals across the country could be affected by this
type of slow-moving scenario.
More uncommon situations do occur. Different geographic localities are
vulnerable to their own specific sets of risks. Manuel (2014) provides a recent example
of a man-made disaster impacting healthcare facilities when a chemical spill
contaminated the Elk River and a municipal water supply in West Virginia. Local
hospitals experienced a surge of over 600 patients with related complaints. Two
hospitals, Thomas Health System and Charleston Area Medical Center, scrambled to
locate an adequate clean water supply (Kloc, 2014). Both hospitals maintained services
with assistance involving collecting water supplies and rationing laundry services and
personal hygiene services. Eventually, a local psychiatric hospital provided laundry
services via an in-house water-recycling wash system. A water-recycling laundry service
is the type of system that helps facilities to remain resilient through challenging
situations.
Community members expect healthcare facilities to provide medical services in
the aftermath of disasters. Hospitals are a crucial component of a community’s
infrastructure that provides patient care, as well as being a significant economic driver in
the community. However, when a disaster strikes, hospitals remain vulnerable assets.
The previous examples demonstrated that hospitals are especially vulnerable to flooding,
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but also to hurricanes, earthquakes, and failure of critical municipal services. The ability
to locate alternate water supplies when necessary is valiant, but not an ideal situation.
Bottled water, truck delivery, and the use of military (often National Guard) or fire
department equipment is the last resort and provides only minimal amounts of water
services. Further, the use of military equipment or fire department resources hinders
those agencies from completing their primary missions. Rationing and then evacuation
of facilities are often the unfortunate and inevitable next steps.
The dire circumstances of the hospitals in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina
and the hospitals in California during the Northridge Earthquake illustrate the
catastrophic situations that can occur within healthcare facilities. In both instances,
multiple regional medical centers were affected by water supply failure. Outside help
was stretched thin, and the only option available was a mass evacuation.
Hospital evacuation. Hospital evacuation challenges comprise an underresearched area, although this topic has received some attention recently. Disetfano et al.
(2006) described both internal and complete (external) evacuations. Internal evacuations
are more common scenarios and include horizontal and vertical evacuations. Horizontal
evacuations occur along the same level of the facility away from the danger area.
Vertical evacuations refer to moving patients to another floor of the same hospital.
Adini, Laor, Cohen, and Israeli (2012) provided an explanation of both internal and
external evacuations. Adini et al. (2012) described four types of evacuations: internal
relocation, evacuation without staff (transfer), full evacuation of patients and staff
members, and early discharge of patients. Internal relocation entails the horizontal and
vertical evacuations described by Distefano et al. (2006). Evacuation without staff occurs
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when a hospital transfers a patient to a safe alternate facility, usually via ambulance. A
full evacuation of patients and staff members requires transport and the availability of
alternate facilities. Early discharge of patients occurs with lower acuity patients that can
follow-up with outpatient care. Transferring of patients and early discharges allow for
opening space which may be needed for additional patients associated with surge
capacity in the aftermath of disasters.
Taaffe, Kohl, and Kimbler (2005) explained preliminary decision making for
when to declare a hospital evacuation. Their research addressed a combination of factors
including the risks of evacuation decisions and outcomes, while considering the
availability of resources and previous training of staff. Risks and resource demands are
constantly shifting throughout disaster events. Taaffee et al. (2005) concluded that more
detailed research and simulations need to be prepared as well as detailed planning and
drills to facilitate the execution of mass evacuations
Evacuation is difficult for patients and staff. The level of risk to patients of an
evacuation varies depending upon patient acuity levels (Taaffe et al., 2005). Evacuation
can require much more effort than simply putting a patient in a vehicle and moving them.
Powell et al. (2012) stated, “Evacuation decisions are complex – to evacuate prematurely
places patients at risk, whereas waiting too long can have devastating consequences” (p.
E1). Some patients may require intensive care, such as medication administration,
ventilation, and other life support equipment. Acceptable facilities and transportation
must be located and arranged. Transportation of patients with high-needs must be
accomplished by Emergency Medical Services (EMS), via either ground or air transport.
Patients on life support may need to be placed on alternate, portable ventilation machines,
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and other equipment. The change in equipment can drastically affect the status of these
patients.
Conceivably, a healthcare facility could declare an evacuation, or begin early
discharges, with advanced warning preceding a disaster event. Pre-evacuation occurred
prior to Hurricane Irene by three hospitals of the Northshore-Long Island Jewish Health
System in New York in 2011 (Verni, 2012). The evacuation was generally considered
successful, in that patients were safely evacuated in a timely manner to appropriate
facilities.
How to best employ the evacuation of a hospital is an area that has recently seen
improved research to demonstrate the methods necessary to complete such a complex
task. Bish, Agra, and Glick (2014) presented a model that evaluated patient needs against
vehicle transport types and accepting facilities. However, the modeling made several
assumptions which are difficult to equate into a practical model that is occurring during
catastrophic events. Assumptions included readily-available ambulance transport, fixed
load, and precise transport times. The model provided by Bish et al. (2014), built on a
previous model by Childers (2010), considered the patients’ needs, but did not consider
transportation and facility availability. Other studies have focused upon which resources
(e.g., transportation vehicles, staff) to determine appropriate transportation requirements
based on patient needs (Taaffe, Johnson, & Steinmann, 2006; Tayfur & Taaffe, 2007). In
the last several years, increasing amounts of research have been published detailing how
to accomplish hospital evacuation. However, gaps in the literature remain regarding
precise conditions that necessitate an evacuation.
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Water Supply Systems
A hospital cannot effectively continue operational processes without water. The
JCAHO reported that hospitals should be prepared to continue services for 48-72 hours
following a disaster event without any outside assistance (JCAHO, 2003). Ideally,
hospitals will be able to return to normal supply routines or identify alternatives within
the 48 to 72-hour window. Once the plumbing is compromised, the piping is out of
service until properly sanitized. To fulfill the need, hospitals must maintain an adequate
supply of water without counting on water that is remaining in the pipes following a
compromise. There may be ways to ration water to certain vital areas through a greater
understanding of general needs.
Food and water. The most basic need of water is for hydration. The lower limit
of water necessary for hydration purposes is one gallon per person daily (Butcher, 2006).
In healthcare facilities, drinking water for emergency events is often stored in bottled
water form. Bottled water can be purchased and stocked in individual bottles, gallon
containers, or multi-gallon containers. Bottled water supplies can have several other uses
as well. Besides hydration purposes, water is also used in healthcare facilities for food
preparation. Most hospitals have kitchen facilities and dining areas in-house. Water is
necessary for a variety of functions of food preparation processes.
Sanitation and sterilization. Cleanliness is a crucial function of healthcare
facilities. Cleaning duties are most often performed through sanitation procedures.
Cleanliness is defined as the removal of dirtiness, while disinfection is the eradication of
microorganisms (Mazzola, Jozala, Novaes, Moriel, & Pena, 2009). Common sanitation
practices utilize chemical disinfectants diluted with water. Chemical disinfectants can be
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applied via spray, as well as handwashing techniques (Saad, 2007). Disinfectants are
widely used due to their cost-effectiveness but do not remove all microorganisms. Handwashing has a long-established tradition in healthcare facilities for the prevention of
Healthcare-Associated Infections (HAIs) (Ellingson et al., 2014). Most hospitals have
policies that require hand washing procedures at multiple steps in the patient care
continuum. Hand washing can be performed with traditional soap and water, as well as
with alcohol-based sanitizers. Alcohol-based sanitizers decrease the risk of HAIs and
have proven to be cost-effective (Chen et al., 2011). HAIs are incrementally more
frequent in developing countries lacking these practices (Bennett et al., 2015). A
combination of traditional hand-washing coupled with the use of alcohol-based sanitizers
is common practice in healthcare facilities to prevent the spread of infection. Checks and
balances are used to ensure proper sanitation of the water supply and handwashing
techniques.
Sterilization in the hospital setting is the most effective technology for the
removal of microbes. Mazzola et al. (2009) defined sterilization as the complete
destruction of microorganisms. Steam sterilization, also known as autoclaving, is the
commonly accepted method. Autoclaving requires a combination of water heated to
steam mixed with chemical disinfectants for optimum sterilization (Jabbari et al., 2012).
Autoclave sterilization is heavily dependent upon water and electricity usage.
Medical functions. A large array of medical functions, including various
treatments and diagnostic testing procedures, are dependent upon water supply.
Diagnostic tests that rely on water supply include x-ray machines, computer
topographical tests, and certain lab procedures (Welter et al., 2010). Diagnostic testing
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does not require intensive amounts of water. However, water is necessary for the cooling
processes of some non-invasive testing procedures.
Many medical treatments require a clean water supply to varying degrees.
Dialysis is a life-saving treatment for patients with renal failure. Dialysis treatment
requires intensive amounts of water. Dialysis is administered through a compound
named Dialysate. A typical dialysis schedule requires 576 liters (152 gallons) of
Dialysate weekly (Ward, 2005). Dialysate is composed primarily of water combined
with concentrates of calcium, magnesium, potassium, and sodium. IV fluids are also
primarily composed of water along with other components. Normal Saline, .9% Sodium
Chloride, is also diluted with water, which in turn is used to dilute many other
medications. It is paramount that clean water is used in Normal Saline and Dialysate
compounds as contaminants can be detrimental to patients with vulnerable renal or
immune systems.
Heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning. Structural ventilation is performed
constantly with Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) machines in
healthcare facilities. Water is needed for cooling processes of many HVAC systems.
Several organizations provided input in the guidance of design and construction of
ventilation systems for healthcare facilities. These groups include American National
Standards Institute (ANSI), American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Airconditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), and the ASHE. Together they formed standards and
regulations known as ANSI/ ASHRAE/ ASHE 170 (Ninomura & Hermans, 2008). It is
important that the ventilation processes are able to provide controlled airflow in operating
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and isolation rooms. Some newer HVAC models are water-free. However, older model
HVACs are water cooled.
Sewerage systems. Excreta are the opposite of clean water supply. Excreta are
generally removed through sewerage systems which are maintained by municipal
services. Municipal providers are generally responsible for maintaining the external
aspects of sewerage systems. Sewerage back-up creates an atmosphere of poor hygiene
and sanitation, leading to increased incidents of diarrhea, malaria, and other
communicable diseases (Noji, 2005a, 2005b). Sewerage systems do not require a clean
water supply to remove excreta. Non-potable water is acceptable to use for excreta
removal.
Other hospital systems. Various other hospital functions are dependent upon
water supply. Fire-fighting capabilities are an essential tool in the event of emergency.
The ability to internally prevent fire damage is vital when emergency services are
deployed elsewhere, such as in an emergency situation. Portable fire extinguishers are an
alternative. Portable fire extinguishers are not a complete defense for the protection of
healthcare facilities.
Water is also needed for laundry services. Low energy and low-water use
washing machines are commercially available and becoming increasingly more common.
New technological advances have made water-recycled laundry equipment an option as
well. Water-recycled laundry services are not a standard practice in hospitals. There is a
notable absence of scientific literature to explain the importance and alternatives in
regards to the water supply used for fire-fighting and laundry services in healthcare
facilities.
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Infrastructure interdependency. It is important to note how many of the critical
systems in healthcare infrastructure relate to each other. For example, computer systems
are powered by electrical systems and electricity production relies on water systems for
cooling purposes. Zimmerman et al. (2005) classified four critical infrastructure systems:
electricity, water, telecommunication, and transportation. These systems are vulnerable
to cascading and sequential uncertainties as defined by Schultz and Koenig (2006). The
interrelation of systems creates dependency which could exacerbate a disruption that
occurs within any one system at the wrong moment (Arbodela et al., 2006). Hanada,
Itoga, Takano, and Kudou (2007) demonstrated how temporary losses of electricity could
negatively affect vital healthcare equipment. A loss of power could impact life support
equipment by resetting devices and returning them to default settings. The
interdependency of critical infrastructure systems increases the vulnerability of healthcare
facilities and highlights the importance of maintaining critical operations.
Review of water needs. Water supply in healthcare facilities is a complex
system with multiple needs for a variety of processes. Dialysate can be stored in 5-gallon
containers. Bottled water can be stored for food and water. Non-potable water is
adequate for laundry, fire-fighting, ventilation, and electricity generation can be stored
separately from potable supplies. The different requirements for water creates the need
for a multi-faceted system where water is stored separately depending on use and
container options, such as IV bags for IV fluids, bottled water for hydration, and reservoir
for laundry purposes. These diverse supplies are then delivered through various means
for specific processes.
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Water Supply Storage
Emergency water supplies can be maintained in healthcare facilities through a
variety of storage options. The U.S. Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH), Center
for Disease Control (CDC) and Prevention (CDC, 2012) offers general guidance for
available storage mediums. Options available for water storage include reservoirs,
bladder -type containers, and bottled water. It may be acceptable to use non-potable
water to perform many functions in healthcare facilities, such as laundry, fire-fighting
capabilities, and sewerage removal. Utilizing non-potable water sources may not be
feasible for certain facilities. The plumbing systems of hospitals are not generally capable
of separating and diverting potable and non-potable water.
Examination of current practices sheds more light on actual preparedness
measures. An audit performed by Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center
(LSUHSC, 2007) reported that the Shreveport facility uses 28,000 gallons of water daily.
LSUHSC-Shreveport maintained 17,000 gallons of water for emergency purposes. The
emergency water supply available to LSUHSC-Shreveport represented an eight to tenhour supply. The audit shows a drastic disconnect between JCAHO recommendations
and actual practices. LSUHSC’s plan for water supply failure also included requesting
the assistance from the State of Louisiana, Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP).
Limited research is available explaining practical trends of current emergency
water supply storage. Saad (2007) described several hospitals in Egypt that utilized
storage tanks. The review of case studies as previously noted often shows a strict
reliance on bottled water supply (Brevard et al., 2008; Butcher, 2006) or delivery by third
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party contractor in the aftermath of disaster (Kloc, 2014; Ramsey, 1994). It is quite
possible, most likely probable, that multiple hospitals are contracting with the same third
party vendors to supply water in the event of an emergency.
Contracting with the same vendors can create an over-reliance on one contractor,
or a select few, to provide water supply to multiple regional hospitals following a disaster
event. Resupply in the aftermath of a disaster relies on the assumption that transportation
routes and supply chains remain intact. Bottled water supply is acceptable for certain
purposes, but it is difficult for a healthcare facility to maintain a supply of bottled water
capable of fully servicing the facility for up to three days.
Issues with bottled water. Bottled water is generally labeled with an expiration
date. However, according to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), water does not
expire (Posnick & Kim, 2002). An early study by Hunter and Bruges (1987) tested
bottled water and found minute amounts of bacteria and ph above advertised levels. The
bacteria and ph levels remained below FDA thresholds. This research examined mineral
waters prior to bottling and did not consider the changes to the water product post
bottling. More recent studies have begun to look at how storage affects bottled water. In
2006, a study by Shotyk, Krachler, and Chen found high levels of the metal antimony,
Sb2S3, in bottled water. This study did not specifically address storage but led to further
research. In 2007, Shotyk and Krachler noted leaching of antimony with prolonged
storage. The findings did not exceed FDA regulations, but they did prove that leaching
of the properties of the polyethylene terephthalate (PET) bottles was occurring
continuously. Greifenstein, White, Stubner, Hout, and Whelton (2013) performed similar
research which examined various storage climates. Their study focused on long-term
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storage of bottled water in Iraq and Afghanistan. Greifenstein et al. (2013) found that ph,
odor quality, and antimony of bottled water increased with prolonged storage in extreme
environments. The ph level and odor levels exceeded FDA recommendation, while
antimony remained under FDA levels and was only detected after 28 days at 60°C. The
various studies do not expose a lethal risk, but they do explain why bottled water cannot
be maintained in storage indefinitely. Concerns also apply to reservoir water.
Reservoir water considerations. Reservoirs store large volumes of water. In the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many facilities in Southeast Louisiana moved to install
well-bore emergency water supply infrastructure. Supply of water via well-bore is not
economically feasible in all locations, though, due to geography and depth of aquifers.
The use of water wells (when possible) or storage reservoirs is an effective way to
maintain large volumes of water. However, reservoirs are not generally utilized by
healthcare facilities.
Reservoir water must constantly be cycled and periodically cleaned and sanitized.
Microorganisms will grow in the reservoir if the water is not periodically cycled (Casini
et al., 2014). Hot water should be stored at a temperature of at least 140ºF; and hot water
pipes should maintain a recirculating temperature of 122ºF to inhibit the growth of
Legionella bacteria (Fathers, 2004). Reservoir maintenance requirements should not
preclude healthcare facilities from considering reservoirs. Further, there is an
opportunity for healthcare facilities to work with local municipal water services to
provide the necessary infrastructure for emergency water needs.
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Summary
There are many needs for water to maintain the continuity of operations in
healthcare facilities. Several water storage options are available for healthcare facilities
that can be used routinely or strictly for emergency events. The results of interruption to
the water supply for healthcare facilities are catastrophic for the organization as well as
the community. Hospital standards call for the capacity to operate 48-72 hours without
assistance (JCAHO, 2003). The practices of healthcare facilities relating to emergency
water supply may not fully address the situations that a hospital can encounter in the
event of an emergency. An over-reliance on bottled water (Welter et al., 2010) and the
expectation for increased numbers of patients in the aftermath of disaster (Al-Kattan &
Abboud, 2009; Bolut et al., 2005; Hick et al., 2009) complicates preparation of an
emergency water supply.
Previous research has provided differing recommendations regarding optimal
water requirements needed in extreme conditions. Butcher (2006) recommended one
gallon of water per day, per person, including staff. The one-gallon recommendation
should be utilized only for survival needs of hydration purposes only. Noji (2005b)
estimated fifteen to twenty liters (four to five gallons) of clean water per person daily.
Noji’s recommendation is interesting as clean water excludes non-potable needs. Gleick
(1996) advised that each person should be allotted fifty liters of water per day, a little
more than thirteen gallons. All water uses are figured into the fifty-liter recommendation,
including bathing, sanitation, hygiene, and food preparation. However, Gleick’s (1996)
study included sub-categories for bathing and sanitation/ hygiene. In the sanitation
category, a considerable amount of water resources is devoted to laundry services. In
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total, Gleick (1996) recommended fifteen liters per person per day (l/p/d) for bathing and
twenty l/p/d sanitation/ hygiene purposes. Gleick’s (1996) recommendation is
comparable with Noji’s (2005b) reference of fifteen to twenty l/p/d, when excluding
bathing and laundry uses.
Due to discrepancies in needs versus capabilities, some studies called for a more
robust supply through planning for up to 96 hours of stand-alone capabilities for
healthcare facilities (Hick et al., 2009; Welter et al., 2010). Calling for the additional
supply capacity recognizes the inadequate resources available for emergency events. A
96-hour recommendation errs on the side of caution, considering the importance of
healthcare facilities to the community, especially in disaster response and recovery
functions.
Healthcare facilities have many considerations to take into account, including
financial pressure. Funding for disaster preparedness is a delicate issue which is
generally insufficient (Cherry & Trainer, 2008). Further analysis by DeLorenzo (2007),
reported that funding for hospital preparedness is often generated through general tax
revenues. Communities are dependent on healthcare facilities for medical services, as
well as employment opportunities (Zimmerman et al., 2005). The economic benefits of a
large employer, such as a hospital, are a crucial component of the recovery process in the
aftermath of disasters.
The literature review shows that studies specific to the hospital water supply
infrastructure for catastrophic situations are limited. Research on the preparedness of
healthcare facilities has not always addressed the full range of needs required for
comprehensive emergency preparedness. Current research is lacking in practical and
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theoretical ideas regarding how to provide adequate amounts of water to healthcare
facilities following a disaster. Fully understanding the phenomenon of the emergency
water supply can help to further develop comprehensive hospital preparedness.

Chapter Three: Methodology
The purpose of this sequential, explanatory mixed methods research is to explore
the capabilities of healthcare facilities regarding water supply during emergency events.
Hospitals continuously require water to provide services. The water supply needs in
healthcare facilities extend into the time of emergency events. The research design is
meant to recognize common themes and future research opportunities relating to the topic
of emergency water supply in healthcare facilities.
The literature review shows the wide variety of water needs within hospitals and
the vulnerability of the infrastructure of healthcare facilities to disaster events.
Regulatory agencies, such as the JCAHO, require healthcare facilities to be prepared for
interruption in traditional services and supply processes. The literature review shows
gaps in preparedness and how hospitals have difficulty providing water resources when
the traditional water supply is disrupted.
The first phase of the research included collecting quantitative data focused on
internal variables describing regular water usage and capabilities that would affect an
emergency event. The following phase consisted of qualitative interviews with those
responsible for the emergency water supply of healthcare facilities. The interviews
provided an in-depth explanation of how hospitals would react in the event of an
emergency to provide water resources to patients and hospital staff.
Research Design
The initial design of the research was based on a quantitative approach. The plan
consisted of surveys administered to the facility operators of healthcare facilities. The
results of the surveys would then be cross-checked with hospital audit records. However,
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it was found that JCAHO audits are performed with a self-designated letter grade system.
The JCAHO recognizes six essential preparedness components: communication,
resources, safety/ security, staff, utilities, and clinical/ support services (The Joint
Commission, 2016). The six components are then separated into subsections. Periodic
reviews of systems are administered via the Hazard Vulnerability Assessment (HVA) and
the facility assigns a letter grade for the result. A satisfactory grade would report the
facility has met mandated standards for the appropriate section. An unsatisfactory grade
would demand the facility make appropriate adjustments followed by reevaluation.
The self-designated letter grade system proved unrealistic to provide quantitative
data for analytic techniques. Further, an absolute grade system did not fully represent the
various contexts of water preparation, storage, and utilization. Therefore, an alternate
means of inspection was developed in a mixed methods approach. As the study
concerned the human subject, an application was submitted to the Institutional Review
Board (IRB) at Arkansas Tech University (ATU) with a design for the Informed Consent
(IC) paperwork and research instrument. The IRB application was subsequently
approved in September 2016.
The mixed methods research design enabled the researcher to fully understand the
needs and capabilities of hospitals regarding their water supply. The approach required a
combination of data collection and interview results performed in an explanatory
sequential order as described by Cresswell (2014). The quantitative portion allows for
confirmation or refutation of a theory or hypothesis. The qualitative section permits
exploration and discovery.
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The quantitative data was collected through the use of an internet-based, crosssectional survey. The survey was created on the web platform QuestionPro. QuestionPro
is known as an economic, user-friendly toolkit and allows for rapid generation,
collection, and analysis of results. The core survey items explicitly addressed the
dependent variable (average water usage), the independent variable (total water capacity),
and moderating variables to determine hospital’s preparedness for emergency events
regarding water supplies.
Shift in research design. Limited survey responses necessitated a shift in
methods further along in the data collection process. A decision was made to prioritize
the qualitative data according to an outline provided by Morgan (1998). This qualitative
approach allowed for complementing the limited amount of quantitative data and further
understanding the decision-making process in emergency events. A similar shift in
research design was adopted by McGraw, Zvonkovic, and Walker (2000). McGraw et al.
(2000) recognized that limited amounts of survey respondents compromised the validity
of their study. The authors then utilized their quantitative results to select a subsample of
the initial target population and to prioritize the qualitative results. The example set by
McGraw et al. (2000) thus served as a template for the approach to this thesis.
The second phase of the research design was qualitative. This section included
in-depth interviews that delved into internal and external factors found to affect the needs
and capabilities of healthcare facilities in relation to water supply. Recognizing the
sequence and priority is the starting point to begin a mixed methods research project. A
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods can complement each other, and thus
provide a more robust analysis (Green, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989). The mixed methods
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approach is especially useful when many factors can influence the dependent variable
(Morgan, 1998). The multiple ways water is used in hospitals and the variety of storage
mediums are consistent with a design needed to explore complex factors.
Figure 1. shows how qualitative data analysis progressed in six steps as
recommended by Cresswell (2014). This analysis flow was adopted for the study.

Figure 1. Validating qualitative results (Cresswell, 2014)

An additional benefit of the research design which was utilized is the ability to
compare and contrast the preparedness processes of two functionally different facilities:
urban and rural. The capabilities of both the facilities represent a microcosm of changes
that have gradually been occurring in the healthcare industry for the last several decades.
Physicians have been slowly congregating towards network-centered practices. Large
health systems have begun to dominate the healthcare market (Ricketts, 2000). Rural
providers have limited capabilities due to increasing costs and decreasing
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reimbursements, while at the same time having difficulty recruiting and maintaining staff
and specialist physicians (Ricketts, 2000). However, the importance of the hospital to the
local, rural community cannot be understated. Rural hospitals are often located in areas
susceptible to natural and environmental hazards (Edwards, Kang, & Silenas, 2008) and
have a significant impact on the local economy (Mandich & Dorfman, 2014; Zimmerman
et al., 2005). Despite the challenges, rural hospitals comprise 1,829 facilities out of a
total of 5,564 in the United States (AHA, 2017). Rural hospitals remain a mainstay of the
American healthcare environment nowadays and in the near future.
The Quantitative Phase
The goal of the quantitative phase of the research was to identify and confirm
areas requiring further reflection. The quantitative data was collected using an internetbased, cross-sectional survey (Cresswell, 2014), that was self-developed on the web
platform QuestionPro. The principal survey questions addressed the dependent variable
(average water usage) and independent variable (total water capacity) for use as
predictors to determine how a hospital prepares for and responds to emergency events
regarding water supply disruption. The survey then considered several moderating
variables to further delineate needs or separate capacity mediums. Finally, the survey
allowed respondents to utilize an open-ended question to describe if alternative plans
were in place for the acquisition of water resources.
The criteria for selecting participants was contingent on locating and soliciting
those responsible for the emergency water supply of healthcare facilities. As such, the
sampling for the quantitative portion was convenience in nature. The facility manager of
the hospital is considered the most knowledgeable regarding the water supply capacity.
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Some institutions may place control of the water supply under different departments and
different personnel. An attempt was made to distribute quantitative cross-sectional
surveys to the facility managers (or appropriate personnel) of twenty healthcare facilities
across Louisiana. Solicitation was made to the targeted healthcare facilities through email or phone call. An explanation of the research as outlined in the IRB application was
then provided for those facilities that returned contact. The research was then explained
to those in charge of the emergency water supply, as well as a copy of the IC form and a
web link to the research instrument. The initial attempt to contact twenty healthcare
facilities led to insufficient survey respondents. The survey population was thus
increased to fifty healthcare facilities in Louisiana. A total of five respondents completed
the research instrument.
The limited number of respondents would not warrant the significance of the
quantitative analysis. To fill the gap of the dataset and explore the context of responses,
the study was further extended to the qualitative section. Focusing on qualitative
inspection is consistent with many mixed methods research approaches from other
disciplines. According to Clark, Huddleston-Casas, Churchill, Green, and Garrett (2008),
“many studies reported only rudimentary analytic techniques, such as reporting
percentages and means for the quantitative data” (p. 1561). The quantitative analysis of
the research design was utilized to recognize core competencies of the survey
populations. The quantitative data may be briefly discussed and used for reliability and
verification.
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The Qualitative Phase
The data collected from the quantitative section showed clear differences in the
needs and capabilities of urban hospitals compared to their rural counterparts. The
amounts of water used on a daily basis and stored for emergency purposes was markedly
greater for the urban facilities. From the five survey respondents, three represented rural
hospitals while the other two hospitals were in an urban setting. Interviews were set up
with those responsible for the emergency water supply at two hospitals. For the
qualitative phase, participants were purposively selected from each of the two groups,
rural and urban.
A telephone interview was conducted with the Emergency Preparedness
Coordinator for Ochsner Medical Center (OMC) in Jefferson, LA. A face-to-face
interview was also conducted with the Facility Supervisor for Our Lady of the Sea
General Hospital (OLOSGH) in Galliano, LA. Interviews were conducted by recording
handwritten notes and then immediately transcribing verbatim. The information
collected was then transcribed and coded according to common themes. Finally, I
combined major findings, such as direct quotes, in table format.
The choices of these two respondents represented a wide disparity of hospital
capabilities. OMC is a fully-functioning, Level 2 trauma center in Jefferson Parish,
Louisiana, capable of admitting nearly 500 patients. A gradual shift has been occurring
in the healthcare delivery system over the last several decades leading to networks of
increasing numbers physicians and sizes healthcare facilities. OMC is the center of a
large healthcare conglomerate in Southeast Louisiana, termed Ochsner Health System
which includes over thirty hospitals and 2,700 physicians (Ochsner, 2014).
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OLOSGH is a rural hospital in Lafourche Parish, Louisiana. OLOSGH has
general surgery availability, no further specialty care services, and can accommodate less
than fifty patients. The US Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (2016) defines rural hospitals in several categories,
including Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs). CAHs provide around-the-clock emergency
care in rural areas and have twenty-five or fewer inpatient beds.
The capabilities of the hospitals selected for the qualitative portion are extremely
diverse. The research design is intended to provide an investigation of the preparedness
trends regarding the water supply for emergency purposes. Interview and survey results
are presented in Chapter Four.

Chapter Four: Results
As stated in Chapter Three, the need of healthcare facilities in contrast to the
capabilities is a prominent theme. Needs are described as water used, and can further be
broken down into subgroups, such as how much water is needed for a particular action or
process. Capabilities can be considered ways that water can be stored or delivered. In
general, needs, and capabilities can be described on a daily basis, during normal
operations.
The overall needs of healthcare facilities must be understood before separating
into sub-groups. OMC used between 5,000 and 10,000 gallons of water on a daily basis.
OLOSGH reports less than 5,000 gallons of water used daily. Neither facility had
significant reservoir or storage capability. Preparedness planning for water supply
interruption at OMC was robust, as shown in the statement in Table 1.
Table 1
Responses to Emergency Water Supplies
Question

Explain the activities the
hospital would take in the
event of an emergency.

OMC

OLOSGH

“A lot stems around
facilities. We have two
water wells…They are able
to provide non-potable
water.”

“We will fill up storage
containers and place a few
of those in the
hallways…They are sixtygallon containers…We
could use this to flush
toilets, etc.”

The planning process to construct the water wells at OMC began following
Hurricane Katrina. This infrastructure was federally-funded and distributed by state
agencies (LRA, 2009). It is interesting to note that the water wells were only capable of
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providing a non-potable water supply. In contrast, the planning process at OLOSGH was
heavily dependent on municipal water supplies as evidenced by the response in Table 2.
Sixty-gallon containers allowed the facility to have a minimal supply capacity. The
storage containers were utilized in an ad hoc manner. The containers could only be
utilized if they were filled prior to compromise of the municipal water supply.
Table 2
Responses to Water Supply Capabilities Change
Question

How would capabilities
change with advanced
warning?

OMC

OLOSGH

“Facility services handles
this. They can shut the ice
machines down to save the
reserves that are in the
system. The gallons are
brought in from an
alternate location. We can
also stock up with extra
gallons and liters.”

“First, we bring in extra
bottled water, then fill the
containers. The hospital
would probably try to
discharge or transfer as
many patients as possible.”

OMC and OLOSGH are located in areas particularly vulnerable to tropical storms
and hurricane events. Both facilities had repeated instances of emergency situations in
the recent past, including Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Katrina, and Hurricane Gustav.
OMC was one of the few hospitals that remained open and accepting new patients during
Hurricane Katrina and subsequent flooding of the greater New Orleans area. Both OMC
and OLOSGH have become accustomed to emergency events with a prior warning as a
result of previous experiences with hurricanes and other incidents.
The hospitals present different approaches to disaster preparedness for emergency
events with prior warnings. OLOSGH would attempt to evacuate patients, if possible,
before an impending emergency event. Transferring patients limits the population that is
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present and allows for available space to accommodate additional patients which may
arrive at the facility. Beyond that, the facility planned to continue critical services and
prepare additional stocks of water resources through the sixty-gallon containers and
additional bottled water supplies.
OMC’s approach was focused on providing additional supplies and conserving
where possible. OMC did not express any plans to evacuate their patients unless
necessary. Following Hurricane Katrina, OMC, which did not flood, provided 45,000
bottles of water or bottled products to staff members, patients, family, National Guard,
security agencies, and personnel of various federal agencies (Ginsberg, 2006).
Conservation measures, such as shutting down ice machines, can limit the needs of the
facility. Ice is a luxury during an emergency event, and these resources can be directed
towards more pertinent uses.
The actions of OMC following Hurricane Katrina portrayed the operations
through difficult times. However, it must be stressed that the well water can be utilized
for non-potable use only, and planning for potable water supplies is contingent on the use
of bottled water products.
Table 3
Responses to Bottled Water Storage
Question

OMC

OLOSGH

How much bottled water is
kept?

“We usually keep around
5,000 gallons.”

“A couple of hundred
gallons, less than five
hundred.”

Both OMC’s and OLOSGH’s emergency potable water supply planning was
centered around the use of bottled water, as explained in Table 3. Both hospitals planned
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to increase reserve supply of bottled water in the event of an imminent emergency.
Neither respondent was concerned with the expiration of bottled water products.
Ginsberg (2006) noted the use of 45,000 bottles of water product distributed following
Hurricane Katrina at OMC. 45,000 units of bottled water products represent a significant
increase over the normal stock levels. It must be noted that OMC was a location for a
FEMA medical clinic following Hurricane Katrina. FEMA may have provided a large
proportion of the bottled water products.
Neither OMC nor OLOSGH reported any reservoir capacity. The water wells at
OMC did not connect to a storage medium. The reliance on bottled water for emergency
preparation was identified. Further understanding of the expected population at the
facilities at the time of an emergency event was further investigated.
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Table 4
Responses to Expected Patients and Staff Members
Question

OMC

OLOSGH

What is the average inpatient admission count?

“I believe it is around
380.”

“Thirteen, I believe.”

What is the maximum
amount of patients that the
hospital can accommodate?

“Somewhere near 500.”

“Twenty-five on the floor,
eight in the emergency
room, and four in the
ICU."

How many employees
would be at the facility in
the event of an emergency?

“800-1200. As low as 5001000 on team A.”

“I would guess twenty-five
to fifty.”

The population in Table 4 represents the true needs of the facilities during an
emergency event. The needs of OLOSGH were a fraction of OMC. OLOSGH reported a
maximum occupancy rate of fifty staff members and thirty-seven patients. The
occupancy rate was dependent upon the number of patients at the hospital. It was
reported in the interview that the hospital “would probably try to discharge or transfer as
many patients as possible.” The average patient census on a daily basis was around
thirteen at OLOSGH. As such, the expected service population in emergency was closer
to sixty, which included both staff members and patients.
OLOSGH’s emergency water supply included about 500 gallons of bottled water.
60 staff members and patients at OLOSGH would require 237 gallons of water in 25
hours according to Gleick’s (1996) recommendation. 500 gallons of water would be
adequate to maintain hydration and other water purposes of OLOSGH for approximately
48 hours. The storage containers can be used for non-potable purposes, but these
supplies will diminish rapidly, and are limited in available applications.
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OMC expected between 1180 and 1580 patients and staff members present at the
hospital in the event of an emergency. The Emergency Response Plan (ERP)
distinguishes an emergency team (Team A) and a recovery team (Team B). Team A is
generally expected to reside within the facility until the danger passed and business
operations return to a normal state. Adequate water supplies must be provided to the total
expected population.
OMC’s capabilities were less clear. 1000 members on Team A, combined with
380 average patients would require 5,464 gallons of water at 15 l/p/d levels. However,
well water can be utilized for all non-potable purposes. The non-potable water can be
used for laundry, showering (not bathing), fire suppression systems, and to be diverted
for critical infrastructure uses. OMC’s existing stock of about 5,000 gallons of bottled
water would not amount to 15 l/p/d for 1,380 staff members and patients over two or
more days. Acquisition of potable supplies may be required to maintain facility services
at OMC.
Table 5
Responses to Dialysis Capabilities
Question

OMC

OLOSGH

How would dialysis be
handled during an
emergency event?

“The thing we are not able
to address well is dialysis.
They would have to be sent
out of the system…”

“That’s all done outpatient…through the
clinic.”

Table 5 addresses a particularly difficult area for hospitals in preparation of
patients with advanced renal needs. OLOSGH did not report renal services, so the supply
of dialysate was not an issue in this case. However, OMC performed in-patient, out-
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patient, and emergency dialysis. Ward (2005) reported a typical dialysis patient requires
152 gallons of dialysate per week. The typical dialysis patient undergoes three dialysis
treatments per week, equaling about fifty gallons per treatment; an extraordinary number
that can add up quickly with only a few renal patients. On average, OMC used between
250-500 gallons of dialysate daily and stored about 500 gallons of dialysate. Re-supply
of dialysate could be complex, requiring delivery from specific suppliers. OMC
recognized that the supply of dialysate is inadequate during an emergency event and the
difficulty of acquiring additional dialysate.
Table 6
Responses to Rationing of Water Supplies
Question

OMC

OLOSGH

Are there any plans in
place regarding rationing
of water supplies if
needed?

“We provide armbands for
essential personnel. This
limits the total that we have
to provide for. We do not
want to limit
consumption…But we do
not want to provide extra,
unnecessary resources.”

“I do not know that. I
imagine administration
would determine if it came
to that.”

Neither OMC nor OLOSGH had any significant plans in place to ration water
resources according to Table 6. OMC planned to utilize the activation teams. The
activation teams limited the amount of employees present. Limiting the number of
employees on campus can quantify an estimate that the facility can use to prepare
adequate resources. Neither facility had agreements in place to acquire water supplies
through a third-party vendor.
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The information provided in interviews is consistent with general trends found in
the quantitative portion of the research. The research results are also consistent with
publicly available material from other hospitals in the region, such as the LSUHSC
(2007) audit. LSUHSC–Shreveport maintained an eight to ten-hour supply of readily
available water with preparations in place for additional spontaneous acquisition.
According to Welter et al. (2010), many hospitals rely on bottled water for an emergency
water supply. Reliance on bottled water is a prominent theme among the results of this
study. To truly affect positive preparedness, hospitals should consider the full range of
needs and a large scale of reserve water supply. A closer analysis should account for the
community involvement in the planning of infrastructure, eventually ensuring the
resilience of healthcare facilities.
The resources of the two hospitals chosen for this study showed stark differences
in a variety of areas. Planning for emergency events is manifested through the extent of
available resources. Both hospitals recognized the difficulty in adequately providing for
their staff members and patients if regular routines were disrupted for an extended
timeframe.
OLOSGH has limited capabilities on a routine basis, such as specialty care
services. OLOSGH planned to remain open throughout an emergency but transfer
patients out of the system if possible. The transfer plan is comparable with the
evacuation of hospitals in New York prior to Hurricane Irene, as detailed by Verni
(2012). Transferring patients also creates additional space in the event of a surge in
patients following a disaster event.

51
OMC’s preparations were much more robust. OMC withstood the onslaught of
Hurricane Katrina and built mitigation infrastructure since then. The water wells should
provide salient benefits in a dire situation. OMC did recognize that dialysis patients may
need to be transferred, but otherwise was prepared to maintain operations throughout an
emergency event if possible. However, the ability to provide potable water for staff
members and patients for longer than 24 hours is dependent upon acquiring additional
supplies, either immediately before or during the aftermath of a disaster event.
The preparedness planning of hospitals entails a wide diversity of needs with
water supplies comprising one facet. Both facilities appear to have learned lessons from
previous disaster events in the region. These experiences are manifested in the storage of
resources, pre-planning to acquire additional supplies, and use of activation teams to limit
populations. However, the consistent reliance on bottled water to cover water needs,
especially potable services, remains alarming.

Chapter Five: Conclusion
As stated in Chapter Four, general trends about emergency water supplies were
recognized during the interview process. These trends include hospital needs, hospital
capabilities, opportunities to improvise, and areas that are not adequately covered. Clear
differences can be noted regarding the capabilities of urban versus rural hospitals. The
hospitals in Southeast Louisiana are in a specific geographic region that is prone to
natural and technological disasters, especially hurricane events. This location
necessitates the regular application of emergency preparedness procedures. Waeckerle
(1991) noted deficiencies in disaster preparedness measures among healthcare facilities.
Wise (2006) found more salient outcomes with prior planning processes, and called for
“the resources to handle all people who present and at the same time also be able to
adequately resupply consumed resources” (p. 1151). Prior planning must consider not
only immediate needs, but also foresee future needs and gaps in capabilities.
Organizations should recognize poor preparedness procedures by learning from
their own previous experiences, as well as the success and failures of like-minded
organizations. The hospitals in Southeast Louisiana noticed the plight of other hospitals
in the region that have been negatively affected by disaster events and adjusted
accordingly where possible. Hurricane Katrina was a landmark event that focused the
world’s attention on Southeast Louisiana. Vulnerable populations were left in
undesirable, sometimes dire, situations. Healthcare facilities were severely impacted.
Many of the hospitals in the region were unprepared for the catastrophe, as shown by
Brevard et al. (2008).
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The literature review showed the diverse needs of water resources within
healthcare facilities. The literature review also revealed how a wide variety of events,
both internal and external, can cause a range of systems failures. Critical infrastructure
systems are dependent upon each other (Arbodela et al., 2006; Hanada et al., 2007;
Schultz & Koenig, 2006), and water supply is a common theme in the continuity of
operations of healthcare facilities.
Major Findings
Rural healthcare facilities, such as OLOSGH, are at a disadvantage for developing
robust disaster preparedness planning. Financing is routinely constrained. The lack of
funding prohibits preparedness measures which may assist the facility in ensuring a
stand-alone capacity as recommended by the JCAHO (2003).
A certain adaptive capacity can be noted in the preparedness planning of the
hospitals included in the research. In systems management, adaptive capacity can explain
responses to changes in the external environment or recovery when changes affect
internal processes (Dalziell & McManus, 2004). Systems change can occur by utilizing
existing resources, new applications for existing resources, or by creating new response
mechanisms.
Existing resources are utilized in OLOSGH emergency preparations plan.
Transferring patients out of the hospital system is an action that occurs on a regular basis.
OLOSGH is a rural hospital that does not have many specializations, such as
cardiovascular, neurological, etc. Patients requiring advanced levels of care must be
routinely transferred to appropriate, alternate facilities. The decision to enhance
movement of these patients out of the hospital system following advanced warning of an
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impending disaster event shows recognition of limited hospital services and resources.
The implementation of storage containers to increase water supply is also an example of
utilization of existing resources. However, the use of this type of storage medium in a
healthcare facility is inconsistent with acceptable water sanitation practices.
Both OLOSGH and OMC’s ability to allocate water during an emergency event is
based on limiting personnel. OLOSGH’s plan to deliver water resources through an
emergency event is contingent upon provision of bottled water combined with
maintaining small patient and staff counts. Limiting patient census numbers may be
possible with advanced warning by discharging or transferring patients. However, the
hospital may easily be left in an undesirable position following a sudden, unexpected
event.
Robust preparedness measures at OMC are consistent with the additional capacity
available to urban facilities. OMC is the center of a large hospital network with
significantly greater resources than its smaller competitors. OMC’s emergency
preparedness plans show a much wider range of adaptive capacity.
The use of emergency activation teams is a well-practiced response. The teams
are separated to give each other adequate recovery time. Assigning team members entry/
exit armbands is a new application of previous resources. Limiting the number of staff
members present also lessens the amount of resources necessary to maintain the facility.
Dialysis is an area of significant concern for renal patients following a disaster event.
OMC must transfer renal patients out of their system only in the event of an emergency,
primarily due to dwindling supply of dialysate. Finally, the drilling of water wells is a
novel response implemented to address a recognized shortage.
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Solutions and Future Directions
In order to gain a greater understanding of the issue of the emergency water
supply of healthcare facilities it will be necessary to provide a wider scale of research.
This research project comprises a unique locale that had recently been severely affected
by Hurricane Katrina. The hospitals in this study, especially OMC, have made
considerable updates to their emergency preparedness capabilities since that time. The
use of water wells is one example of structural upgrades to OMC’s emergency
preparedness planning. However, the use of well water may not be feasible for all
geographic regions.
The cost of water wells increases in environments with elevated topographical
features. A greater understanding must be gained of the cost-benefit of various types of
storage mediums. Cost-benefit modeling can help individual hospitals recognize specific
alternatives that best fit their environment. Effective cost-benefit analysis of the water
supply of healthcare facilities can only occur with the assistance of multiple departments
within hospital administration.
Finally, it must be understood that it may not be possible to prepare for every
situation or to provide indefinite resources in the event of certain disasters. In these
cases, it is important to make effective use of all resources. Some uses of the water
supply that are necessary on a daily basis may possibly be temporarily withheld in
emergency situations. Rationing can include delaying processes, such as laundry
services. Rationing does not need to strictly be defined as withholding resources.
Computer algorithms can provide modeling features to explain how water resources can
be diverted for the most pertinent uses.

56
Synergies can be considered that may have alternate daily functions but are able
to provide emergency capacity. An example would include a swimming pool that is used
for physical therapy. The water in the swimming pool can be used as a storage reservoir
and diverted for use when necessary. An elevated swimming pool, such as on a rooftop,
can also provide adequate water pressure.
Finally, community preparedness forums offer one of the greatest opportunities to
enact positive improvement to policy initiatives on the local level. The presence of
healthcare facilities is beneficial to communities both economically and for medical
services (Mandich & Dorfman, 2014; Zimmerman et al., 2005). Community
preparedness coalitions need to recognize the limitations of the water supply in healthcare
facilities and the consequences of inadequate supply to vulnerable populations.
Stakeholders involved in community preparedness coalitions include organizations and
individuals in position to provide water supply initiatives, such as public works, critical
infrastructure providers, public administrators, along with healthcare organizations
(JCAHO, 2005). Collaboration between these key stakeholders should prioritize access
of water supplies to healthcare facilities during extreme events. Water towers or
reservoirs should be built on or near hospital grounds. Close access could ensure that
water supply be diverted to hospitals in the event of catastrophe. A dedicated storage
medium could ensure that water supplies are diversified, with bottled water adding to
reserves. A water tower in close proximity seems to be an ideal solution that can assist
healthcare facilities in providing for vulnerable populations.
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